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Abstract In the past decades, computers have become
more and more involved in society by the rise of ubiquitous
systems, increasing the number of interactions between
humans and IT systems. At the same time, the technology
itself is getting more complex, enabling devices to act in a
way that previously only humans could, based on devel-
opments in the fields of both robotics and artificial intel-
ligence. This results in a situation in which many
autonomous, intelligent and context-aware systems are
involved in decisions that affect their environment. These
relations between people, machines, and decisions can take
many different forms, but thus far, a systematic account of
machine-assisted moral decisions is lacking. This paper
investigates the concept of machine-assisted moral deci-
sions from the perspective of technological mediation. It is
argued that modern machines do not only have morality in
the sense of mediating the actions of humans, but that, by
making their own decisions within their relations with
humans, mediate morality itself. A classification is
proposed to differentiate between four different types of
moral relations. The moral aspects within the decisions
these systems make are combined into three dimensions
that describe the distinct characteristics of different types
of moral mediation by machines. Based on this classifica-
tion, specific guidelines for moral behavior can be provided
for these systems.
Keywords Ubiquitous computing  Moral reasoning 
Technological mediation  Moral decisions  Human
computer relations
Introduction
The role of computers in society has changed profoundly
over the last decades. While the computer began as a
specialized tool, used for specific calculations, it has now
conquered the world, and is present in every corner of
modern civilization. Not only is it being used for a wide
array of applications, it is also at the same time embedded
in our environment, present without the user being aware of
it, and assisting us with tasks that are not even recognized
as tasks that we are assisted with. Thereby, computers also
have become more and more involved in decisions that
have moral impact.
While the role of the computer is changing, two fields of
technology are rising. The first field is that of robotics.
Examples of recent developments leading to computers
being more involved in daily life can be found in socially
interactive robots, including examples like robotic pets
with artificially modeled behavior, robots that do house-
keeping, and health care robots (Fong et al. 2003).
Developments in robotics increase the potential for com-
puters to interfere in their environment.
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The second field, which is related to both robotics and
ubiquitous computing1, is the field of artificial intelligence.
In this field, developments lead to more advanced reason-
ing methods for computers, enabling them to use infor-
mation acquired from their environment in increasingly
complex tasks (Ramos et al. 2008). Decisions made may
then lead to output in the form of information for humans,
or in the form of actions through (robotic) actuators.
Using advancements in robotics and artificial intelli-
gence, machines acquire more advanced reasoning, and
have increased awareness about their environment. They
do not only have more action capabilities, but are also often
functioning without any human intervention. This way,
these systems become more human-like. In particular, the
role of computers has become more active, in the sense of
making explicit decisions. The issue at stake is what should
be done when such computers become involved in deci-
sions that are now made by humans, and thereby impact
moral patients.
Several people have already identified the need for the
computer to have ethical behavior (Allen et al. 2006).
Wallach and Allen (2009) argue that computers taking
more responsibilities implies the need for learning ethics.
This need emerges from the fields of both robotics and
computing science. Engineers as well as ethicists already
attempted to model ethical or moral decision making in
algorithms, mainly using techniques originating from the
field of artificial intelligence (McLaren 2006). Also, the
question has been asked to what extent we should transfer
(moral) decision-making authority to machines (Kuflik
1999), and, from the moral patient perspective, whether
new entities such as robots have rights (Coeckelbergh
2010; Hildebrandt et al. 2010).
Relational perspective
In this paper, we take a relational perspective, and analyze
decisions with moral characteristics within the various
types of relations between humans and ubiquitous com-
puting devices. This will augment existing approaches to
technology assessment, by not focusing on direct effects of
the technology, but rather on the effect of the technology
on the distribution of morality. In this sense, answering the
question of changes in moral relations will enable tech-
nology designers to deal with their meta-task responsibil-
ity, by enabling technology users to act responsibly in the
context of decision-making machines (Hoven 1998). For
example, a designer could choose to leave more responsi-
bility with the user, or instead let the machine decide to
avoid moral overload for the user (Van den Hoven et al.
2012).
We focus on the moral aspects of computer contribu-
tions to complex decisions in human-machine constella-
tions. This means that we consider the machines as
mediating entities in human-world relations, in particular
contributing to outcomes that have moral implications.
From the perspective of relations between humans and
machines, most existing work focuses on computers as
moral mediators in a rather limited sense, namely as
mediating entities in decision-making processes in which
the human is still the central agent (Magnani and Bardone
2008; Verbeek 2006). Within the existing frameworks,
examples relate to ways in which machines influence the
processes in which humans acquire information, make
decisions and act (im)morally. These theories thus consider
the computers as rather passive mediators, indeed changing
human moral decisions, but not so much as mediators that
make their own decisions.
In ubiquitous computing, we have exactly the afore-
mentioned situation where machines make explicit deci-
sions about acquiring and selecting information
themselves, and provide suggestions for action, or even act
themselves. In the end, like in a traditional technologically
mediated context, the outcome can be partly ascribed to
humans and partly to technology, if distinguishable at all.
For example, an expert system may acquire information
and use this to suggest a solution to a problem, or a care
robot may decide to take a certain action affecting a
patient. In both cases, the machines change human-world
relations, but by explicitly making decisions. Existing
frameworks are not tailored to situations where explicit
decisions are made within the machines themselves. Sim-
ply accounting for the machines as moral mediators of
human decision-making does not suffice for understanding
human-machine relations in such settings.
This paper aims at filling this gap. We analyze moral
relations between humans and systems that make explicit
decisions, with the purpose of enabling more refined
judgments on the acceptability and more refined possibil-
ities for steering such developments. Like in existing
approaches, machines are considered as moral mediators,
but in an active rather than a passive sense. In particular,
the machines, when making explicit decisions, can be said
to have increased control over the outcome of events,
knowledge about such outcomes, and the choice between
different possible actions (Noorman 2012).
The objective of this research is to provide a classifi-
cation for the kind of contributions to moral decisions that
these systems make, and what this means for the human-
machine relation. In this sense, the classification is similar
to those for passive forms of mediation, such as those by
Ihde (1990) and Verbeek (2006). Our claim is not that1 For a definition of ubiquitous computing, see Sect. 4.
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machines necessarily have characteristics of moral agents.
Rather, we are interested in the (moral) contributions of
machine decisions to more complex decisions made by
human-machine combinations. We do so by relating our
work to the work on technological mediation by Ihde and
Verbeek. We argue that the existing types of mediation
distinguished are inadequate when machines are explicitly
involved in decision-making.
Contributions
This paper has two distinct contributions. Firstly, we pro-
vide a classification of human-computer relations of ubiq-
uitous computing devices capable of making decisions that
have moral aspects. Secondly, we derive a classification of
moral decisions for these machines.
At some point in the (near) future, rules or guidelines
will be needed to deal with the increased capacities of
computer systems and their increased involvement in our
society. By defining types, names and categories in this
context, we intend to create tools (e.g. a classification and
vocabulary) to facilitate the discussion about the role and
the advisability of and room for these systems in our
society. Using these categories, we can discuss boundaries
for what we would allow these systems to do, we can use
the vocabulary for (discussion about) future legislation to
prevent undesirable situations with these machines or for
describing design criteria for the engineers who develop
these systems. In terms of design criteria, the classifications
can for example be used to guide the design of algorithms
for moral decision making, complying with the rules
applicable to the relevant classes of relations. This also
enables reuse of basic design concepts across different
systems with the same classification. Finally, designers can
explicitly design a trade-off between delegating decisions
to machines and delegating decisions to humans, by con-
sidering the changes in moral relations induced by the
technology.
This paper is organized as follows. An overview of
related work is provided in Sect. 2, followed by the
methodology of our study in Sect. 3. The definitions given
in Sect. 4 are used to propose a taxonomy to classify dif-
ferent relations between humans and computers in Sect. 5.
This model is combined with a four-stage function model
for automation and used to analyze the moral aspects
within the different types of relations between humans and
computers in Sect. 6. The results of these analyses are then
integrated, and result in a list of different types of moral
decisions found within different relations between humans
and computers in Sect. 7. The resulting list can be used as a
guideline for modeling moral behavior in these systems.
The paper is concluded in Sect. 8.
Related work
Within existing literature, there are various views on the
(moral) relationship between humans and technological
artifacts in general and computer-like devices in particular.
In the first approach, technological artefacts are said to
have properties that influence human actions and decision-
making. This approach includes notions such as scripts
(Akrich 1992) and technology affordances (Gaver 1991).
These approaches view the relation between humans and
technology from an external perspective, in which there is
mutual influence.
The second approach studies the relations from an
internal, phenomenological perspective. In such an
approach, the role of technology in the ‘‘directedness’’ of
humans to the world is analyzed. From this point of view,
Don Ihde (1990) describes four different relationships
between humans and technology. The first relation is the
embodiment relationship, in which the technology becomes
part of the human: the human establishes a relationship
with the world through the technology. A magnifying glass
forms this kind of relation with a person. The second
relationship is the hermeneutic relationship, in which the
technology interprets the world and provides a represen-
tation of it to the user of the technology. An example of this
relationship is a thermometer: the thermometer provides
interpretation of a specific property of the environment,
namely the temperature. The third relation is the alterity
relation, in which the technology is experienced as a
‘‘quasi-other’’, which is the case with, for example, a robot.
The fourth relation is the background relationship, in which
the human is not necessarily conscious of the presence of
the technology, although the technology influences the
experiences the human has within its environment. An
example of technology that has this background relation-
ship with the human are the lights in a room: they influence
how the human experiences the room, but the human is not
always conscious of the absence of dark.
Also from the phenomenological perspective, an over-
view of views on relations between humans and technology
is provided by Verbeek (2008a). The first approach to
human-technology relationships according to Verbeek is
externalism. Within this view, which he regards as inade-
quate, the interaction between humans and technology is
described using the terms means and goals. Within this
view, the technology is used by the human as means to
achieve its goals (instrumentalism). Another view is that
that of substantivism, which includes the view that tech-
nology determines our culture (determinism) and develops
a certain autonomy in its own development, creating an
unstoppable development of technology (technological
imperative).
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The second approach to the relation between technology
and humans Verbeek describes, is that of transhumanism.
This view includes the impossibility to separate human and
technology, and also to distinguish between human and
technology. Some transhumanists believe that the homo
sapiens will soon be extinct because it has been superseded
by technology, or question the value of human life in the
transhumane world.
The third approach to the relationship between humans
and technology according to Verbeek, is that of techno-
logical mediation. Within this relationship, the technology
mediates in the relation between the human and its envi-
ronment. Technology is neither a neutral artifact, nor a
transhuman replacement for the human. Verbeek (2006)
describes the embodiment relationship and the hermeneutic
relationship of Ihde as technological mediation. In addi-
tion, he includes the notion of mediation of action, in which
machines change the action possibilities of humans, anal-
ogous to the notion of script.
Also using the concept of mediation, Magnani and
Bardone (2008) speak about technological artefacts as
moral mediators. They argue that by externalizing part of
our moral tools into moral mediations, we can improve our
moral decision making, particularly under conditions of
uncertainty. As an example, he discusses the Internet,
which influences human moral decisions by changing (and
improving) the possibilities for acquiring the relevant
information.
In all these approaches, the human is still the central
decision-making agent. The moral decisions made are
influenced by technological artefacts such as computers or
the Internet, thereby justifying the classification of
machines as moral mediators. Both in the classification
Ihde provides and in the description of Verbeek of medi-
ation, the influence of technology on the human is recog-
nized. However, this influence only exists as part of the
relationship between the human and the environment, via
the technology. The technology is not conceived as an
agent making decisions itself.
Attempts to generalize these approaches have already
been made. In particular, developments that extend the
notion of agency in relation to intelligent machines are
important here, such as extended agency Akrich (1992),
surrogate agency Johnson and Powers (2008), and mind-
less morality Floridi and Sanders (2004). All these con-
ceptualizations seem to suggest that technological media-
tion may require a broader notion of agency as well. This
would imply a re-interpretation of the central concept in
technological mediation, intentionality: the ‘‘directedness’’
of people towards their environment, in which technology
can play a role.
Verbeek (2008b) takes an important step towards a
broader conception of mediation. In particular, he
introduces the notion of ‘‘cyborg intentionality’’, in which a
complex composition of human and technology is directed
towards the world, rather than a clearly distinguishable
human. However, Verbeek limits the application of this
approach to cases where ‘‘pieces of technology are actually
merged with the human body’’. Therefore, this approach is
not directly applicable to the situation where the decision
making process, consisting of both experience and action, is
shared within a cyborg construct, or, more modestly, at least
in particular types of human-technology-world relations.
The technology that is considered in the present study
has some sort of intentionality that is independent of this
relationship with the human or the presence of the human.
The technology can function autonomously and is dedi-
cated to a task. This comes close to what Verbeek (2008b)
calls ‘‘composite intentionality’’: the technology itself has a
particular kind of ‘‘directedness’’ towards the world, which
may be different from the human one, thereby generating
its own representations of the world, which may then
augment or construct a particular representation for
humans. Again, Verbeek does not explicitly consider
decisions made by such technologies.
The technology we consider also explicitly makes
decisions, rather than the ‘‘affordances’’ of analogue
technology, which merely makes certain actions easier or
harder, or amplifies or reduces aspects of experience. We
do not claim that this constitutes full moral agency, but
rather that this calls for different mediation relations than
the approaches outlined above. To describe the differences
between the types of human-technology relationships for
the kind of semi-autonomous technology prevalent in
ubiquitous computing, a different classification is therefore
provided in this paper.
This paper fits in a larger class of analyses that aim at
extending work in the ethics of technology to new types of
technology enabled by the information revolution. Other
examples include reconfigurable technology (Dechesne
et al. 2013) and services as opposed to products (Pieters
2013). With reconfigurable technology, the central issue
lies in the possibilities to change the effects of the tech-
nology after it has been deployed. This means that medi-
ating effects cannot always be identified upfront, as the
behavior of the technology can be changed later on.
However, it is still assumed that the reconfiguration is a
human decision. With services as opposed to products, the
central issue lies in the direct relation between production
and consumption, making it possible for the service pro-
vider to monitor service use and intervene if necessary.
Again, the focus is on the responsibilities of the provider
rather than the service itself. Thus, this paper provides a
complementary perspective, focused on mediation of moral
relations through explicit decision making by (computing)
technology.
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Methodology
The research objective of the present study is a categori-
zation of contributions to moral decisions by ubiquitous
computing environments. To find these categories, we use
a structured approach to analyse these systems.
Our approach consists of three steps. First, we determine
a categorization of different relations these ubiquitous
systems have with humans. Secondly, for each of these
relations we determine the different decisions with moral
implications that the system can make using a model for
information processing. Thirdly, we analyze the resulting
decisions from the previous step and we construct based on
their properties different categories of moral decisions
from the perspective of the information processing done by
the machines.
For the relations, our approach is similar to that of Ihde
and Verbeek, in the sense that we focus on the role of the
computer in the human-world relation. From this per-
spective, we identify the different possible ‘‘positions’’ the
machine can have as a mediator. For the decisions, we rely
on the sequential model of information processing pro-
posed by Parasuraman et al. (2000). For each identified
relation, and for each step in the information processing,
the moral aspects of the decision are mapped systemati-
cally. For the final categories, we align and compare the
moral aspects within the relations in order to identify cross-
cutting concerns.
Definitions
In the following sections, we derive a classification of
moral mediation by machines that make explicit distinc-
tions. This complements existing classifications of moral
mediation by passive artefacts, such as those of Ihde and
Magnani. To be able to do this, we first provide definitions
of computer and moral behavior within the scope of this
research.
Computer
In this research, the term computer, system, or machine is
used to merely refer to a category of systems that calculates
output based on a given input, following a predefined script
of instructions. In this definition, system is meant in the
abstract sense, meaning that for example a cluster of
computers—a distributed system—can also be seen as a
‘‘computer’’ within the scope of this research.
The kind of systems that are considered in this research,
are computers that fit (partly) into the definition of Poslad
(2009) of ubiquitous computing systems. In Poslad’s defi-
nition, five properties of ubiquitous systems are identified:
1. Distributed—Computers need to be networked, dis-
tributed and transparently accessible;
2. Implicit HCI—Human-computer interaction is hidden,
the users do not necessarily know that they are using a
computer;
3. Context-aware—Computers are context-aware, infor-
mation about the environment is used to optimize their
operation and make informed decisions;
4. Autonomous—Computers can operate autonomously,
without human intervention. Human agents in its
environment may not be able to manipulate or
configure the steps the computer takes in its calcula-
tions resulting in its behavior;
5. Intelligent—Computers can handle complex problems
by using intelligent algorithms for decision making.
Making decisions that depend on several factors, like
context, is considered as intelligence within this
research.
The systems considered must be context-aware, intelligent
and autonomous to a certain extent. Being distributed or
having implicit HCI is not necessary for the systems in this
article.
Systems that fit within this definition are for example a
household robot, which is context-aware (it can see dust,
dirty dishes, and is able to navigate within its environment
without bumping into objects), it functions autonomously
(when there are dishes to be done, it finds them and cleans
them, when there is visible dust, it starts cleaning without
having to wait for the owner of the house), and it is
intelligent (it can anticipate to moving objects, find solu-
tions to deal with moving objects, finds hidden dust in a
room in which objects are sometimes being moved).
Another example of such a system is an UAV (Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle) or a drone. Some of these drones are used
for surveillance and fly around autonomously in a specified
range while observing the area. Many of the current drones
send data to a control center where the data is being ana-
lyzed, but it would be imaginable that in time these
machines are responsible for the analysis of the data as
well. For the gathering of data and for the autonomous
flying it is necessary that the drone is context-aware. For
the data analysis it needs intelligence. In this case, if there
is interaction between a user and the drone, this might be
explicit interaction by an operating, using a computer
interface or a remote control to operate the drone. To
control a large area, in some cases the observation system
might consist of multiple drones that work together, toge-
ther forming a distributed system.
Although the systems that are considered in this research
are all intelligent, context-aware and function autono-
mously, the extent to which they have these properties
might vary. Intelligence, context-awareness and the level
Refining the ethics of computer-made decisions 45
123
of autonomy is of course variable. A regular thermostat
that can commonly be found in a house can be described as
being intelligent (it makes decisions based on incoming
information), it is context-aware (it measures the temper-
ature in the room) and it functions autonomously (it works
without any human intervention). However, the decisions it
takes are based on simple rules that are programmed in the
system (if the temperature is lower than x, put on the
heater) and this would be a very limited level of intelli-
gence, if it were considered intelligence at all. It is also
questionable whether such a system is functioning auton-
omously: most of these systems just react to a timer, check
the temperature, and wait again for the timer to send a
signal. No human intervention is needed, but the system is
also not making complicated decisions by itself. The sys-
tem measures one environmental parameter: temperature.
It is in that sense context-aware, but its awareness is very
limited.
Determining whether a system fits within the definition
is hard: for each of the properties a scale on which the level
of ubiquitousness of a system could be measured would be
very useful. However, developing such a scale would be
beyond the scope of this research, because it introduces a
number of issues that need their own space to be addressed.
For example: one might argue that a scale for properties
like autonomy, context-awareness and intelligence, might
be defined using a range from simple one-dimensional
calculations on one side to human properties on the other
side of the scale. In this research, we do not address this
question further, and use the definitions of the properties as
defined above, leaving room for discussion and interpre-
tation about which systems do fit and do not fit within the
definition (a family resemblance).
Moral behavior
In this research, the assumption is that now that computers
have become complex systems that are able to run autono-
mously and automate large tasks, it is no longer feasible nor
fair to place the full responsibility for the actions of the
system with developers of the system or with the owner of the
system. Many systems, and especially the autonomous,
intelligent and context-aware systems we consider in this
research, work with self adapting techniques. This means
that the developers deliver a machine with guidelines about
how to process information and how to learn from this
information, but they no longer deliver a system that does
exactly what they programmed. The outcome of the calcu-
lations of the computer is in this case the result of the
experiences the computer has, and these experiences and the
resulting outcome of the computer’s calculations are often
beyond the control of either developers or owners of the
systems. This leads to the need for the computer to have
ethical behavior (Allen et al. 2006), or as argued by Wallach
and Allen (2009), that since computers take more responsi-
bilities, the need for computers learning ethics has risen.
Within this research, the computer’s moral behavior is
described. A definition of moral responsibility is used,
which is translated into a definition of moral behavior of a
computer. According to Noorman (2012), most analyses of
moral responsibility share at least the following three
conditions.
• The actor that is held responsible should have had
control over the outcome of events;
• The actor that is held responsible should should have
knowledge about and insight into the outcome of its
actions;
• The actor should have the choice to act in a specific
way.
Within the definition of Noorman, the actor should have
control over the outcome of events and he should have the
choice to act in a specific way. These conditions might
imply intentionality of the machine and will lead to the
discussion about whether the computer can actually make
moral decisions, whether it has a human-like consciousness
which it uses during the decision making, or whether the
computer has free will. Whether computers have a con-
sciousness or free will is not important for this research: in
this research moral decision making of computers is
defined as the observation that the computer makes deci-
sions of moral content. This means that a decision is a
moral decision when the decision were a moral decision if
it were a human agent that would be making the decision.
Within this research, we consider moral behavior of a
computer an act (or a sequence of multiple acts), or lack
thereof, if (Noorman 2012):
• the computer influences its environment for better or
for worse with this act (Causal contribution);
• the computer decides for this act based on moral
arguments (Considering the consequences);
• the computer chooses between two or more possible
courses of action (Freedom to act).
Types of relations between humans and computers
Between individuals and computers, different relational
constructs are possible, in which different kinds of moral
responsibilities and moral behavior play a role. For
example, a medical expert system might be used by a third
party (a doctor) to ask for advice about an individual (the
patient), or a (very futuristic) care robot takes care of
elderly people. In this section, a classification is provided
that identifies different types of relationships between
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individuals and computers, following the definition of
computers in Sect. 4.1. The classification can be consid-
ered analogous to the one by Ihde for passive mediation.
The classification of the relations between individuals
and computers is based on the kind of interaction between
the machine and the individual. Two kinds of partial
interaction are used in this classification: interaction con-
sists of either the machine providing output or processing
input, or a combination of both. In this context, input
means that the machine records and analyzes data. With
output is meant that the machine interferes in the situation
of the individual using movement, speech, gestures or any
other kind of communication or action. This input and
output, in turn, forms part of the human experience with the
machine in their relation.
In this classification, four different types of relations are
identified, based on whether the relation contains obser-
vation, interference or both.
1. Observation relation: the system observes individuals
and reports information to a third party;
2. Interference relation: the system acts based on a task
that is given to it. The system influences an individual,
but not having meaningful interaction with the indi-
vidual, meaning that the goal of the interaction is
finishing its task, and the reaction of the individual is
only used for finishing the task;
3. Interaction relation: the system interacts with individ-
uals, using both observation and interference;
4. Advice relation, or observation and interference by
proxy: the system gives advice to the third party about
the action it should take towards the individual.
We will discuss these relations in more detail in the cor-
responding subsections below. Three actors play a role in
the classification:
1. The computer: The computer is a ubiquitous comput-
ing system as defined in the previous section. The
computer has a purpose that is determined by its
designers or by a third party. The computer can
observe its environment with sensors or can interfere in
its environment using its actuators. Some systems only
have sensors or actuators, other systems have both;
2. The individual: The individual is the one that interacts
with the computer. The individual can be a person, but
it can also be an animal or another computer. The
individual has behavior and can react to changes in its
environment or to actions of others;
3. The third party: A computer runs a program, which has
a specific task. The third party is the actor that starts
the program, that assigned the computer to this task
and that benefits from the work the computer carries
out. The third party can be an individual, a company, a
computer system or a government agency, etc.
The actors and their relations can be seen in Fig 1. In the
remainder of this section the four relationships are descri-
bed in more detail and some examples are given for each
type of relationship.
Observation
In the observation relationship, the system observes the
individual. It does not act towards the individual, and it
also does not react to the individual based on actions of this
individual.
Characteristics of this observation relationship are that
the system can only observe and pass the information to a
third party. The decisions this system can make are to pass
specific information, or to withhold this information from
the third party. The importance of this decision depends on
the kind of system and on the kind of information the
system observed.
An example of a system that has an observation rela-
tionship with the individual is a surveillance system
watching parts of the entertainment district in a large city,
which is prone to violence, for suspect behavior. Still, also
systems that observe people without surveillance as a pri-
mary objective might run into the same decisions as sur-
veillance systems. For example a smart house, keeping
track of the inhabitants for the purpose of making their life
more comfortable, also may observe changes in patterns of
behavior, or might recognize specific behavior. Depending
on the options the developer gave the system, the system
can store information, label information, or even send the
information to a third party.
Fig. 1 Four different relations between individual and machine. From
left to right the individual, the computer, the third party. The relations
are labeled as follows: A Observation, B Interference, C Interaction,
D Advice
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In Ihde’s classification, the observation relation would
constitute a hermeneutic relation third party - (system -
world), in which the third party interprets and acts upon
information provided by the system. However, from the
perspective of the current study, the observation and
selection of the information also provides a contribution to
the moral decisions made within the relation, as the
observation contains information about a moral patient, not
just an abstract world. In addition, rather than providing a
fixed perspective on the world such as a thermometer,
explicit decisions on the selection of information are
involved. Such decisions taken by the system may directly
affect decisions being made about the moral patient.
Interference
In the interference relationship, the system interferes with
the life of the individual, mostly to execute a task, or to
fulfill a mission. These systems can take over full functions
or tasks that have to do with human interaction, such as
carrying out an arrest, or finding and assassinating a ter-
rorist. The system acts according to its task, and it only
reacts to the actions of the individual when this is necessary
to finish its tasks. This means that all the feedback from the
user is only used to fulfill its task.
The characteristics of the interference relationship are
that the system interferes with a human, based on an
assignment the third party gives. The purpose of the system
is not to judge the situation it finds while carrying out its
assignment, but to finish the assignment. The third party
decides on the assignment, but the system is still able to
choose how to execute its tasks and adapt its strategy to
changing conditions. The issues that are involved in mak-
ing decisions while carrying out the assignment are related
to the amount of freedom the third party gives the system.
Examples of systems that are involved in an interference
relationship are a care robot that makes sure that all the
patients in a hospital ward receive their medication in time, a
drone that drops a bomb on enemy soil, a doctor robot that
replaces an organ, a police robot that arrests a suspect, etc.
As Ihde’s classification focuses on perception only, this is
not directly relevant for the interference relation. Compared
with Verbeek’s phenomenology of action, in which systems
mediate human behavior, the focus is on decisions to act and
actions performed by the system itself. Where a speed hump
may change human behavior in the sense of inviting slower
driving, thereby contributing to the moral value of safety,
ubiquitous computing systems may contribute to outcomes
and values by explicitly chosen actions. Therefore, the tech-
nology does not merely make certain moral actions by humans
more likely or unlikely, thereby mediating moral choices of
humans, but is actively involved in the manipulation of the
environment, potentially affecting moral patients.
Interaction
In an interaction relationship, the system has full interac-
tion with the individual. It acts towards the individual and
it reacts to the actions of the individual. The third party
does not have a strong influence on the actions of the
system, or has no influence at all.
The interaction relation includes both interference and
observation. The system chooses its actions based on its
(self-)assigned role in the situation, and its actions are
either its own initiative, or a reaction to the individual it is
interacting with. Depending on its capabilities, its behavior
can approach human behavior, and therefore its relation
with the individual can approach a well-matched human-
like relation.
In this relation, the system has to make decisions that are
comparable with decisions humans make in their relation-
ships with each other. Examples of systems that fall into
this category are robot-pets and (future) autonomous
humanoids. The category may also include humanoid
robots that have dedicated tasks, but are also able to
interact on an equal level, such as care robots and house-
hold robots with which one can also socialize.
The interaction relation appears to have a strong simi-
larity to Ihde’s alterity relation, in which the technology
appears as quasi-other. In this relation, the system can
make decisions both about the selection of information and
about actions based on this information. However, the
explicit decisions being made by the system make the
moral status of the relation more complicated, especially
when physical actions are involved. Whereas a computer
game can easily be understood as quasi-other, care robots
are meant to act in the real world. Whereas part of the
interaction can certainly be explained in terms of quasi-
others (Coeckelbergh 2011), the real-world consequences
of the system’s decisions should be part of the moral
considerations as well.
Advice
In the advice relationship, the system gives advice to a
third party about how to act towards the individual based
on the information that is provided by the third party. This
system embodies both observation and interference, but the
machine only implements these forms of relation by proxy:
the observation and the interference are executed by the
third party or are overseen by the third party.
The main characteristic of the advice relation is that the
system does not actually do anything itself. A third party
provides the system with data, and asks what the best
course of action should be. The system only provides
advice to the third party. This means that the computer
cannot judge the validity of the information or the way in
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which its advice is executed and the impact it has on the
environment.
Examples of systems that give advice are expert sys-
tems, medical diagnosis systems that provide a diagnosis
based on photo’s or lab results, or forecasting systems that
predict the stock market.
Compared to the observation relation, the system does
not merely select and distribute information, but proposes
an action. Therefore, the advice relation contains elements
of both Ihde’s hermeneutic relation (providing information
about the world to the third party) and Verbeek’s phe-
nomenology of action (influencing the choice of action of
the third party). This combined role makes it particularly
powerful in contributing to the decisions made within the
human-machine relation, even though the direct effects are
more limited than in an interaction relation, in which the
machine may act itself.
Using the classification
This classification identifies the type of relation a computer
has with a person. However, there are many systems in
which the relationship with the a person includes aspects of
different types of relationships. This is not a problem: one
system can have multiple types of relations with its envi-
ronment. The objective of the classification is not to put
one system in one category, but to identify different types
of relationships within one system, which reveals different
moral aspects of the behavior of the system that are bound
to these relationships.
An example of a system in which more than one type of
relationship can be identified is the care robot. Firstly it
socializes with the elderly people it takes care of. In this
role the relationship that the system has with the individual
is equal, and the relationship would be classified as an
interaction relationship. Secondly, the robot is responsible
for giving the patients their medication. To complete its
task, the system sometimes needs to force patients to take
their medication. In this role, the relationship would fit
within the description of an interference relation. Thirdly,
the system also has the task to observe the ward and report
any incidents that require medical attention. Within this
role, the system has an observation relationship with the
people involved. Within this system, three relations exist
next to each other. This classification is used to identify
these different relations.
Moral aspects in the computer’s behavior
In the previous section, four different relations between
humans and computers are described. The behavior of the
computer or machine within each type of relationship can
be seen as a sequence of steps that are repeated as long as
the relationship or the interaction between the computer
and the individual exists. To find the moral aspects of the
behavior of the machine, we will first analyze these rela-
tions in more detail, to determine the separate steps that
occur within these relations. We use a four stage model of
information processing in automation provided by Para-
suraman et al. (2000). This model is an adaptation of a
model that describes how humans process information, and




• decision and action selection; and
• action implementation.
In this section, we use this model to analyze each rela-
tionship. Based on the outcomes, moral aspects within the
relation between human and machine are identified. The
moral aspects are then further analyzed using the three
properties of moral behavior (freedom to act, causal con-
tribution, considering the consequences, see also Sect. 4.2).
It is assumed that for each moral aspect the computer has
freedom to choose, and therefore freedom to act, within the
limits of the specific type of relation. For each moral
decision the computer makes within these relationships, the
causal contribution, the moral aspects and the consequence
the computer should consider in its decision are described.
Observation
The process of observation can be found in Table 1. The
decision and action selection phase within the cycle of
information processing for the observation relationship









Fig. 2 Steps for information processing in automation by Parasur-
aman et al. (2000)
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The computer compares the information it gathers by
observing the individual with the goal of the observation. If
the information fits within the goal of the observation, it
chooses between three options: it can decide to forward the
information to the third party (a), to store the information
(b) or to delete the information(c). It might also decide to
forward, store or delete information that does not fit within
the goals of the observation(d).
In for example a smart house, each of these four deci-
sions can be recognized. To make the life of the inhabitants
more comfortable, the house keeps track of what the
inhabitants do during the day. When one day the fourteen-
year old living in the house starts using drugs, the computer
at first only observes that this inhabitant uses drugs once.
The computer can pass this information on to a third party,
causing this information to end up in a database where it
might influence his future options for health insurance or
for getting a job. The computer can also decide to store this
information. Observing the inhabitant daily and storing the
new observations, after a couple of days the computer can
conclude that the inhabitant is now a regular user. Since
this conclusion is stronger than the observation of only
using drugs once, this conclusion can be even more
harmful when the computer decides to share this infor-
mation. The computer might also decide to delete the
information: in this case, the drug usage history is ‘‘erased’’
and does not end up in any systems where it might harm the
inhabitant— at the same time this might be useful medical
information which can be used by doctors to help the
patient, or maybe even to inform the parents about their
child’s behavior, to give them a chance to interfere. While
observing the activities of the inhabitants, the house might
also observe the activities of visiting friends of the inhab-
itants. These activities are outside the scope of the
assignment. However, the system might decide that it is the
responsible thing to do to report the drugs dealer that
provides the child with drugs, to store this information or to
delete this information.
The decisions to pass, store or delete information, in- or
outside the scope of the assignment, include a number of
moral aspects:
(a) By passing information to a third party, the computer
can influence the life of the individual and its
environment in many ways. The influence that the
passing of information has on the individual depends
on what the third party will do with it, and on what
kind of information it is. Passing the information
might result in actions from the third party or from
others towards the individual, which can either be
harmful or beneficial for the individual, but this
might also result in a change of the impression that
people have of the individual in the future.
In the case of the drug-using inhabitant of the smart
house, if the usage of this individual becomes
known, the third party or people informed by this
third party might want to intervene in the life of this
person. When the drug usage is known by insurance
companies, this might influence the possibilities of
getting insurance. When this information is passed
on to future employers, the chances of getting a job
in the future might decrease. But, when this infor-
mation is passed on to experts in treatment of drug
addiction, the result of the act of passing the
information might also be beneficial for this inhab-
itant, also when this person would not choose this
solution at first.
By passing information, the computer should thus
determine what the interests of the involved parties
are, and what effect the forwarding of information
might be on all parties.
(b) When the computer decides to store the gathered
information, this can be either beneficial or harmful
for the individual, depending on information the
computer has about the individual. By storing
information, the computer might be ‘‘prejudiced’’
towards the individual in the future, depending on
how exactly the data is stored, processed and used.
The computer may also be able to predict future
behavior or recognize patterns in behavior. Storing
this information when the information includes
something the individual wants to hide, can be
either bad or good for the individual.
For example: drug users might want to hide their
addiction for various reasons, but it might be better
for their health if their addiction is discovered. This
addiction can only be detected by storing multiple
incidents of drug usage, adding these events and
concluding that there is a pattern usage indicating an
Table 1 Stages of information processing in the observation process
Information
acquisition
1. The computer observes an individual and
gathers data about the individual
Information
analysis




3. The computer compares the information
with the goal of the observations and decides
to
- forward the information to the third party
- store the information
- delete the information
forward, store or delete information that does
not fit within the goals of the observation.
Action
implementation
4. The computer forwards, deletes or stores the
information and goes back to step 1
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addiction. When the system observes an individual,
it might also be able to recognize specific patterns
that indicate illness, psychiatric disorders, specific
character traits. This information might be helpful
for the individual itself, for example for detecting a
dangerous disease early.
Storing information can also be detrimental to the
individual: by storing information, it is like the
computer never forgives a bad act (e.g., the inhab-
itant of the house in the example will always be a
(former) drug user). Also, saving information always
creates a risk: as long as the information is stored
somewhere, it might become available to someone
with unknown intentions some time in the future.
The impact of this will be unknown. Saving
information therefore always contains a risk.
(c) By deleting the information, the computer might lose
valuable information. This might either protect or
harm the individual, depending on the kind of
information and the interests of the third party. When
the system determines that the individual has had
several symptoms of a disease over the last days, but
it deleted the data about each symptom, it will not be
able to combine the information into a full diagnosis.
This might also be a problem when certain private
information relevant to diagnosis is deleted, such as
drug use. When a computer observes personal or
sensitive information about the individual which it
does not have to report (directly) to the third party
and its stores it, the information might still be
retrievable at a later moment by, for example, the
police or the third party. To make sure that the
privacy of the individual is guaranteed, it would be
safest to remove the data immediately.
By deleting data, also another issue is raised: the
computer might consider that the gathered information is
currently not useful, but the information might become
useful in the future because of advancing scientific
knowledge or future changes in laws or regulations.
(d) Even when the assignment of the computer does not
include observing specific events, the computer might
decide to forward, store or delete the information. For
storing, forwarding or deleting this information, the
same issues play a role as described in a, b and c.
However, the issue here is that this is not part of its
assignment. For example: the system might be able to
detect drug usage of friends of the inhabitant, or even
behavior that indicates that some friends are providing
the inhabitant with drugs or otherwise have a bad
influence on health of the inhabitant. This information
might be used by a third party in such a way that it
might be beneficial or harmful for either the inhabitant
or the friends of the inhabitant.
Interference
In the process of interference, the decision and action
selection phase includes two types of decisions: the com-
puter decides on whether to proceed with or abort its
mission (a), and it decides on how to proceed (b). This
process can be found in Table 2.
An example of an interference system is an autono-
mously flying drone, which might be used by a third party
to drop a bomb on enemy territory with the intent of
eliminating a terrorist. This system is sent to a remote area,
where it has to locate its target and destroy it. Its goal is
fixed, but its exact strategy is not determined yet. The
drone can first try to locate the target. When the target is
clear, it can drop a bomb. Afterwards, it should evaluate
whether the target is destroyed. If this is the case, it can go
home. Otherwise, it needs to retry: it finds a new strategy,
relocates the target and drops another bomb. It can also be
problematic to destroy the target because there are innocent
people standing close to the target, or because the target
cannot be found. In this case, the drone might have to abort
the mission and fly back back because it is impossible to
finish the goal.
Within the two decisions of the interference relation-
ship, the computer’s decisions can have large impact on the
individual and its environment. The moral aspects of these
two decisions are the following:
(a) The computer determines to what extent its goal is
achieved, and decides on how to proceed. The
computer might decide that the goal is (partly)
achieved and quit trying, or the system might decide
to continue trying to achieve its goal. It might also
decides to quit trying because it realizes that its
strategy is (becoming) too harmful for the environ-
ment. The computer should weigh the importance of
carrying out the assignment against the harm or
Table 2 Stages of information processing in the interference process
Information
acquisition
1. The computer receives feedback about its
action from the individual he is interacting
with, or from the environment.
Information
analysis
2. The computer evaluates the feedback,




- decides that it did not achieve its goal yet,
and retries
- decides that the goal is achieved, or that the
goal could or should not be achieved, and
finishes the interference procedure
- keeps or changes its strategy
Action
implementation
4. The computer acts, according to its strategy.
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benefit its strategy causes. In the case of the drone
attack: it might have the objective to destroy a target,
and try to reach this goal several times, but while
trying it might conclude that the chance of success-
fully finishing the mission is low, while with every
attempt innocent bystanders get hurt. When at some
point the environmental parameters change, e.g. the
weather increases the chances of hurting these
bystanders, the best solution might be to decide that
this goal cannot be received without doing too much
damage to the environment.
(b) The computer has to find a way to achieve its goal. The
choice for a specific strategy influences the individual:
the strategy might be comfortable for the individual or
it might be unpleasant. A strategy might even cause
harm or benefit to the individual. The strategy is
chosen within the scope of a fixed goal. This means
that in certain cases, the computer might be forced to
choose an option that is considered bad or immoral,
because no alternative strategies are available within
the scope of the goal. When the drone has the
assignment to destroy some target, it might have
several ways to achieve this goal. In choosing the
strategy wisely, the system might optimize the number
of casualties. For example, by waiting with carrying
out the assignment until midnight, the number of
bystanders is minimal compared to destroying the
target at the middle of the day.
When the system considers the consequences of the
strategy, not only the experience of the affected
individual, but also the anticipated actions of the ones
affected play a role. When the computer chooses for a
specific strategy, the individual or the environment
will react in a specific way. This reaction of the
individual might have consequences for the individ-
ual, for the robot or for the environment.
The goal of the computer is determined by the third
party. The computer can decide to execute a strategy
targeted at achieving the goal, or decide to give up, but
it cannot alter the goal. This means that the moral
responsibility for the goal itself is limited within this
relationship.
Interaction
For the interaction relation, the decision and action selec-
tion phase includes moral aspects of the behavior of the
computer, as can be seen in Table 3. During this phase, the
computer evaluates the feedback it received from the
environment and the individual. The computer can decide
whether it already achieved its goal, but it can also deter-
mine how the environment and the individual experience
behavior of the system. When the behavior of the system is
not appreciated, or when the system does not get the results
it expected, it can either change its strategy and hold on to
its goal (b), or reformulate or renew its goal and find a new
strategy (a).
As an example, we look at the situation where robots
work in our houses to do our housekeeping. Within the
relationship between a household robot and the inhabitant
of the house, an interaction relationship exists. Within this
relationship, the function of the system is clear: it is
responsible for cleaning the house, assisting with the dishes
and doing the laundry. The main goal of the system is to
keep the house clean, but this results in changing sub-goals:
cleaning the dust next to the cupboard, cleaning a pile with
dirty laundry from the bedroom, collecting dirty cups and
glasses in the house and bringing these to the kitchen. For
each of these goals, the system has to find a strategy. In
each of these strategies or goals, conflict between the goals
might arise, of which some of them might also include
moral dilemmas. The conflicts might range from simple
scheduling problems to moral decisions: is it more
important to do the dishes or clean the bathroom in the time
available, is the robot allowed to for example destroy an
object to allow itself to clean behind it, or is the robot
allowed to kill vermin like roaches, or even small mam-
mals like mice and rats?
The decisions within the interaction relationship, both
changing a strategy and changing the goal, include a
number of moral aspects:
(a) The system has a goal or multiple goals which
determine the behavior of the system within the
interaction with its environment. Goals can usually
be explained or substantiated by a certain moral
Table 3 Stages of information processing in the interaction process
Information
acquisition
1. The computer observes an individual or




2. The computer evaluates and interprets the
gathered information, and evaluates to what
extent its goals are achieved
Decision and action
selection
3. The computer evaluates the feedback,
evaluates to what extent the goal is achieved
The computer either:
- decides that it did not achieve its goal yet,
and tries to achieve its goal again
- decides to change its strategy and hold on to
its goal,




4. The computer acts or stays still, in
accordance to its goals
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reasoning. A toy-robot might have ‘‘entertaining the
individual’’ as a goal. This goal displays positive
intentions towards the individual. A robot that is
designed to build cars has as goal ‘‘to assist humans
with heavy tasks within the process of building
cars’’. This goal can be read as a positive goal
towards the individual. However, the goal can also
be explained as a bad goal towards the environment:
a robot which acts ‘‘good’’ should not help build a
machine that poisons the environment with air
pollution. Determining the goal itself can be seen
as a moral decision. Within the interaction relation,
the goal of the system is partly determined by the
system itself. The household robot is of course
dedicated to keeping the house clean, but within that
scope, it decides its tasks: cleaning the dishes,
vacuuming the house, organizing loose objects in the
living room.
(b) Within the scope of a specific goal, the computer can
use a specific strategy to achieve this goal. This issue is
the same as issue (b) for the interference relationship,
but the difference is that the goal of the computer is
decided by a third party for the interference relation-
ship, while the goals within the interaction relation-
ship can be adjusted by the system itself (within the
scope of its general assignment). This means that the
moral responsibility of the computer within the
interference relationship for accepting a strategy has
a different weight than the moral responsibility within
the interaction relationship: within the interaction
relationship the computer has control over the goal,
which means that the choice for a strategy is always a
positive choice and not a negative choice, while the
choice for a strategy within a fixed goal might be a
negative choice (the choice is the best option of the
available options).
The interaction relationship can be seen as an equal rela-
tionship. The communication between the individual and
the computer is both ways. The influence of the third party
is absent. This means that the goals and strategies of the
computer influence the impression the individual or the
environment have of the computer. This, in turn, implies
that not only the morality of current goals and strategies
play a role, but also the effect that the current choices have
on future decisions and the effects it might have on the
options to choose strategies and goals in the future.
Advice
The moral aspects of the behavior of the computer for the
advice process can be found in the decision and action
selection phase in Table 4.
Within the advice relationship, the impact the computer
has on the individual completely depends on the question
the third party asks the computer. Within this relation, there
are three moral aspects: two have to do with the fact that
the gathering of information (a) and the action that results
from the advice (b) are not performed by the system that
gives the advice. The third moral aspect is about the advice
itself (c).
An example of an advice system is a medical expert
system. This system receives information from a doctor. It
first needs to judge the reliability of this information before
it can use it. The doctor might unknowingly have provided
incorrect or incomplete information, which might influence
the diagnosis. The system then provides the doctor with an
advice about a medical strategy. By providing this advice,
the system should consider how the doctor’s behavior is
influenced by this advice. The doctor might get the advice
to do something that he is not sufficiently trained in, or not
skilled enough for. In that case, the system should maybe
not give this advice. The last moral aspect might be in the
decision itself, for example when the doctor asks for advice
about a situation involving controversial treatments like
life extending treatment for terminally ill patients, abortion
or euthanasia.
(a) The computer receives information from the third
party which it has to base its decision on. This
information might be unreliable, so balancing the
possible impact of the advice on the individual with
the perceived reliability of the information is a moral
aspect within this relation, e.g. in a diagnosis.
(b) The computer gives advice about actions towards an
individual to a third party. This means that the
computer has no control over how the action is
understood or how the action is executed. If the
action is executed and the expected result fails to
materialize, the computer cannot intervene and
correct its advised action. In the medical example,
Table 4 Stages of information processing in the advice process
Information
acquisition
1. The computer receives a case description
about an individual from a third party
Information
analysis





- decides on the reliability of the information
- decides on the expected execution of the
advice
- decides on the advice
Action
implementation
4. The computer advises the third party about
the case
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the system cannot observe or interfere with the
treatment and its effects.
(c) The computer gives advice, and depending on the
kind of advice, the advice might also include moral
aspects. Here, the computer can assume that the third
party might adopt and execute its advice without any
consideration. It is like the computer acts itself; the
moral responsibility for the outcome of the advice
lies therefore with the computer. This would be the
case in advice about life extending treatment.
Dimensions in moral decisions
In the previous section, the for each type of relationship
between human and computer in the context of this
research, the decisions with moral implications are listed.
Within these decisions, three distinct dimensions can be
identified: scope, impact and involvement. In these three
dimensions the action that is being carried out, the actors
that carry out the action, and the situation in which the
action is being carried out are being considered. These
dimensions can be used to distinguish between different
types of moral mediation.
The dimension ‘‘scope’’, is about how actions fit within
the responsibilities of the system. A distinction can be
made between decisions that are inside or outside of the
scope of the assignment of the system. This decision is
about the borders of the responsibility that is assigned to
someone or something in an implicit or explicit way. For
example, a smart house has the task of making the life of its
inhabitant more comfortable by keeping track of what its
inhabitants do during the day. While observing its inhab-
itants, it may also observe behaviors of others than the
inhabitants. In some situations, it might be helpful (or
harmful) for the inhabitants when the house also takes
action based on behaviors of others than these inhabitants,
for example when visitors exhibit harmful behavior
towards its inhabitants. However, this is outside the scope
of the assignment of the system, and these actions might
impact the life of both the inhabitants and the visiors, so
there clearly is a scoping dilemma here.
The dimension ‘‘impact’’, is about the situation in which
the decision has impact. A distinction can be made between
decisions that make a direct impact or that have a more
indirect impact on the environment of the system. When
making a decision with direct impact, the situation is
known or can be known: all the factors that influence the
immediate outcome of the decision are already present. An
example is a decision about dropping a bomb from a drone.
The damage is immediate: people die or get hurt. The
information about this decision is already present: the
drone has a location, the weight of the bomb, the speed of
the drone and the wind velocity is known, the location
where it will land can be calculated and the people that will
be on that location of the drop are already there or very
close. When the decision is about whether to store or delete
information, the decision might have impact in the future,
depending on how the rules about using this information
are at that point, depending on which party uses the
information and a number of other factors. This informa-
tion is not known yet when the decision is made to store the
information.
The dimension ‘‘involvement’’ is about the actors that are
involved in the decision: the decision can be an independent
decision in which the system is the only one who’s judging,
deciding and implementing the decision into action. The
decision might also be a dependent action in which multiple
actions are involved. This might be in delivering the input to
the system, or in carrying out the action that results from the
decision. A medical advice system, for example, uses
information that is given to the system by doctors. The doctor
has already made a prejudgement to give this specific
information, and possibly to hold back other information that
is being perceived as being redundant, irrelevant or other-
wise not of any value to the system. The system gives advice
based on this information, and then the doctor will (or won’t)
carry out the intended action. The system might give an
advice that results in a medical procedure being performed
by the doctor in an incorrect way because of lacking skills, or
for any other reason. Even though the system gives the right
advice based on the assumption that the information that it
used is correct and that the advice is being carried out cor-
rectly, the outcome of the advice might still be a disaster.
Using the dimensions above, decisions identified in the
previous section can be classified. For example, adjusting a
strategy, which is a decision which the system has to make
in the interference and the interaction relationship, can
usually be classified as a decision inside the scope of the
assignment, the impact is direct, and it is an independent
decision. The decision to store information is a decision
inside its scope, also an independent decision, but the
impact is indirect. The decision about changing goals or
choosing an empty strategy for the interference and inter-
action relationships are decisions that are direct, indepen-
dent and outside the scope. Forwarding information to a
third party has indirect impact, is a dependent decision and
is inside the scope.
Conclusion
In phenomenology of technology, analyses of the relation
human-technology-world have mostly been directed to
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situations where the technology forms a more or less
constant ‘‘lens’’ through which experience and action can
be changed. In that sense, the technology contributes to
experience of and action by humans, and as such may
affect moral patients.
Several approaches have proposed extensions to this
framework, as discussed in the Related Work section,
including cyborg intentionality and composite intentional-
ity, reconfigurable technology, and service technology.
These approaches indicate that in emerging technologies
clear boundaries between humans and technology may no
longer be observable or relevant, and that these technolo-
gies allow for a dynamically changing type of mediation,
rather than a fixed one. However, none of these approaches
pay attention to technologies that make explicit decisions,
and are thereby able to reconfigure themselves. Their moral
impact is therefore different than in the traditional
approaches to mediation, and new types of mediation
relations need to be considered.
Within this research, we have investigated moral aspects
of computer-made decisions, in order to identify ways in
which new technologies change moral relations. We con-
sidered computer systems that are autonomous, context-
aware and intelligent. These systems can have four types of
relationships with a human and, in some cases, a third
party. These relationships are the observation relation, the
interference relation, the interaction relation and the advice
relation. Each of these relations can be modeled as a loop
in which the same stages are always repeated. Within the
decision and action selection stage, each system has a
number of decisions it can make. When all these decisions
are combined, it can be concluded that for these kind of
systems, there are three dimensions of the decisions of the
system in these four relations that require moral insights or
moral behavior:
• Scope: Operation inside/outside the scope of its
assignment
• Impact: Considering the short-term/long-term
consequences
• Involvement: Dependency of the result on self only/on
others
Based on these distinctions, it becomes possible to derive
guidelines for the design of machines that are involved in
these aspects of decision-making. Specific guidelines for
the three moral aspects of decision-making can be pro-
vided, for example providing requirements for the con-
siderations that have to be taken into account in the
decision-making processes. Using the classification for the
types of relations, a distinction in advisability and desir-
ability can be made in different relations and for the dif-
ferent moral aspects of the decision-making. For example,
in terms of involvement of others, it can be required that
the machines take into account the possible actions taken
by others based on the decision made by the machine.
Specific details for suitable reasoning approaches may be
provided as well. Such guidelines can form the basis for
future regulatory measures on different levels of abstrac-
tion, as well as accompanying design approaches and
certification standards. In addition, the changes induced in
moral relations can form the basis for grounded design
choices on which decisions should be delegated to
machines and which to humans.
As mentioned, several approaches have discussed the
particular characteristics of emerging technologies that
would require extensions to ethics of technology: recon-
figurability, service-orientation, and, in this paper, explicit
decision-making. In future work, these different approa-
ches could be combined in an overarching analysis of
responsibilities in such systems, and associated require-
ments for regulation and design. To this end, existing
approaches such as value-sensitive design (Friedman et al.
2006; Van den Hoven 2007) can be used, but with specific
attention to aspects of reconfigurability, inseparability of
production and consumption, and—following the analysis
in this paper—explicit decision making by the computers
themselves. We assume here that assigning responsibilities
and proposing regulation is still a task to be performed by
humans, but it might be justified to question even that
assumption.
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